CHAPTER 15

Intergroup Relations and Reconciliation: Theoretical Analysis and Methodological Implications

THOMAS E. MALLOY

Humans form groups in order to survive; membership in a collective affords safety, task allocation, close relationships, a collective social identity, and a common fate (Campbell, 1958). Powerful groups claim desirable resources that enhance members’ welfare at the expense of less powerful groups, and history is replete with instances of intergroup conflict over material (Campbell, 1965; Halloway, 1974; Heylighen & Campbell, 1995; LeVine & Campbell, 1972) and social (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) resources. It is axiomatic that group formation provides an in-group advantage that also breeds intergroup conflict.

The Continuum of Intergroup Relations

Violent conflict and altruistic cooperation represent opposite ends of a continuum of intergroup relations with a midpoint of peaceful coexistence. Along this continuum intergroup relations are reciprocal. Deutsch’s (1973) “law of social relationships” states that “characteristic processes and effects elicited
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by a given type of social relationship (cooperative or competitive) tend also to elicit that type of social relationship” (p. 365). Sherif and Sherif (1979) claimed that interaction between groups “is determined by the reciprocal interests and the goals of the groups involved” (p. 10). A basic assumption made here is that intergroup relations are typically competitive though nonviolent, and that reciprocal violence and altruistic cooperation are atypical cases.

Reconciliation: Change in the Reciprocal Responses of Groups

To reconcile, groups must transition from reciprocal conflict to peaceful coexistence and mutual acceptance; in some rare cases reconciliation can lead to reciprocal trust and support for attainment of material and social reinforcement. Weaver and de Waal (2003) defined reconciliation as “the exchange of friendly behavior between those involved in a fight (former opponents)” and view the phenomenon as an evolved social mechanism that maintains homeostatic autonomic arousal in individuals. Reconciliation has been observed in a number of primate species, including humans (de Waal, 2000), and may occur at different levels of analysis: in dyads, within an intact group, and between groups. A well-developed literature on reconciliation among primates at the dyadic and intragroup levels exists (see Weaver & de Waal, 2003); only recently has attention been directed to the intergroup context by social psychologists (e.g., Nadler & Laviatan, 2006).

Intragroup Reconciliation

When individuals’ outcomes are mutually dependent, for example within a marriage, a peer group, or a primate colony, reconciliation is essential to maintain the structural integrity of the unit, to reduce members’ tension, and to maximize individuals’ reinforcement. Within groups, high status members will diffuse others’ conflicts, those with a vested interest in the opponents will intervene, and third parties will mediate reconciliation (de Waal, 2000).

Intergroup Reconciliation

Reconciliation processes have also been observed in the intergroup context (Judge & de Waal, 1994), however this is much more complex than intragroup reconciliation because mutual dependency may be absent, or not perceived by the antagonists. In some cases groups have never had a cooperative relationship;
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Historically, their interactions have been characterized by status asymmetry, inequality, mistrust, dislike, or violence. Moreover, antagonists may not believe that mutual outcome dependency can be achieved or, because of intense hatred, may not wish to positively engage the enemy. These are variables that moderate intergroup relations and set limits on reconciliation, which, like conflict, is a special case of intergroup relations. Reconciliation is a reciprocal phenomenon, unfolding over time characterized by a transition from conflict to peaceful coexistence, or possibly, cooperation. An assumption made here is that the “friendly behavior” witnessed in intragroup reconciliation may be an unrealistic short-term goal in most cases of intergroup reconciliation, especially when groups have a long history of acrimony and violence. Peaceful coexistence is likely a more realistic outcome in these cases. The basic questions for a social psychology of reconciliation are “what system of variables affects reciprocal intergroup responses?” and “what variables affect the transition from intergroup conflict to peaceful coexistence?” A theoretical analysis of intergroup relations and the implications for reconciliation follows. Also considered is a theoretical model of intergroup relations and two forms of reciprocity that are relevant to reconciliation.

Basic Constructs in Intergroup Relations

The science of intergroup relations is in its “infancy” (Brewer & Brown, 1998), and no “adequate theory of intergroup relations” exists (Mackie & Smith, 1998). Yet, to understand reconciliation a conceptual model of intergroup relations is necessary so that the empirical agenda is guided by an integrated, general conceptual framework. Decades of work reveal four basic constructs that determine intergroup relations; they are ethnocentrism, stereotypes, affect, and the perceived equality of opportunity for resource attainment. Often treated as separate research topics, the Intergroup Relations Model (IRM), elaborated later, is proposed to integrate these constructs and can explain a broad range of intergroup phenomena including reconciliation. Intergroup relations are conceptualized using Sherif’s (1966) definition: “Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group identification, we have an instance of intergroup behavior” (p. 12).

Ethnocentrism

Since Sumner’s seminal analysis (1906), social psychology has focused on intergroup attitudes (e.g., Austin & Worcel, 1979; Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Brewer & Brown, 1998; Brigham, 1971; Brown, 1986; LeVine & Campbell, 1972;
Mackie & Smith, 1998; Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004; Sherif & Sherif, 1979). Brewer and Campbell’s (1976) research on ethnocentrism among East African tribes revealed that groups “without exception, rate their in-group more favorably than it is rated by any other outgroup” (p. 143). Substantial data document in-group ethnocentrism (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Mullen & Hu, 1989; Sherif, Harvery, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; Stephan, 1985).

Because groups are contexts for social identity development (Brown, 2000; Tajfel, 1978, 1982; Turner, 1987), processes relevant to the personal self operate similarly in groups (Crocker & Park, 2004). Individuals are motivated to view themselves, and have others view them, positively (Taylor & Brown, 1988), and this is also true in the intergroup context (Turner, 1987). Individually and collectively, people are naïve realists who assume the correctness, validity, and superiority of their worldviews (Pronin et al., 2004) while exaggerating perceived differences between groups (Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995) that precludes appreciation of similarity and a common fate (Ross & Ward, 1996). Ethnocentrism is most virulent among groups in immediate proximity (Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Mackie & Smith, 1998) because of competition for the same resources (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001).

Stereotypes: Shared Social Consensus

Group membership is associated with a litany of defining features (e.g., Allport, 1954; Brigham, 1971; Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996; Fiske, 1998; Hamilton, 1981; Katz & Braly, 1933). Allport (1954) stated, “life becomes easier when the category is not differentiated. To consider every member of a group as endowed with the same traits saves us the pain of dealing with them as individuals” (p. 169). Categorization of individuals into the “we” and “they” groups affects perceived variability and covariability of members’ traits. Restricted variability often characterizes out-group judgments, whereas the variability of in-group members is acknowledged (e.g., Mullen & Hu, 1989). Category stereotypes are efficient, and even necessary, for information processing. The expectation that all triangles have three sides is rational, however expectations are degenerative when perceived invariance is irrational (e.g., most Muslims are terrorist sympathizers).

Perceived Equality of Opportunity for Resource Attainment

Successful competition with other groups for material resources is one function served by group formation (Campbell, 1965; Heylighen & Campbell, 1995), although groups also compete for social resources such as status, prestige,
power, respect, and positive social identity (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 1987). Groups compare their resource attainment to determine if, given equivalent effort, reward is equitable (Festinger, 1954; Homans, 1974). Even when competition is fair and resource attainment is equal, groups are inclined to perceive their “share” as inequitable (Brown, 1986, 1988; Pronin et al., 2004), and such perceptions moderate intergroup processes (Brown, 1986; Dovidio et al., 2004; Fiske, 2004; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Pruitt, 1998) including reconciliation. Groups perceived as high status competitors are seen as cold, whereas groups that do not pose a competitive challenge are seen as warm (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). When advantaged groups perceive competitive injustice, prejudice toward the disadvantaged may decrease (Dovidio et al., 2004), or inequity may be justified (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001).

Intragroup and Intergroup Affect

Group identification facilitates self-definition (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982) when membership is “emotionally significant” (Brewer & Brown, 1998). The concepts of “we” and “us” activate positive affect outside of awareness (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990); likewise affect is implicated in responses to an out-group. If an out-group threatens the security of the in-group (Fiske et al., 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), or challenges defining features of that group’s identity (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999) negative affect is a consequence. When competing for social resources such as status, members take malicious pleasure (i.e., Schadenfreude) in the competition’s defeat (Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003). When competing for resources, intergroup relations “take on an emotional valence from the beginning, with its character being negative and competitive” (Blake & Mouton, 1979, p. 31). When one is a member of a group, its outcomes determine the emotions experienced by a member, and intergroup emotions impact intergroup behaviors (Dijker, Koomen, van den Heuvel, & Frijida, 1996; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). When a group has high status (Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1995; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992), disproportionate resource accumulation (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; Staub, 1996), or superior power (Keltner et al., 2003) there is an inclination to experience negative emotion toward and move against an out-group.

A group that controls attainment of material (e.g., food, economic opportunity, safety) and social (positive identity, respect, trust) resources has greater social power than one lacking this control (Keltner et al., 2003). Power asymmetry varies as a function of social construal (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001) and objective group characteristics (e.g., size, wealth, or weaponry). Whether power is
arbitrary or objective, high social power is expected to produce positive affect, attention to reward attainment, contempt for, and an undifferentiated view of groups with low power. Low social power will produce frustration, negative affect, humiliation, mistrust, attention to threat, and differentiation of the characteristics of the powerful because they control reinforcement (Keltner et al., 2003). Studies of interactions of stigmatized and nonstigmatized persons (e.g., Miller & Malloy, 2003), and persons with different status (e.g., Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Fiske, 1993; Guinote, Judd, & Brauer, 2002) provide confirming data. Affect appears to play a central role in intergroup relations functioning as a mediator between intergroup cognition and behavior.

Implications for Intergroup Reconciliation

The transition from conflict to peaceful coexistence must entail a change in reciprocal intergroup ethnocentrism, stereotypes, affect, and ultimately behavior. When groups in conflict view one another as members of a superordinate category (e.g., humanity) ethnocentrism, negative stereotypes, and negative affect should abate (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005). Likewise, viewing one’s antagonists inclusively affects the standards of justice used to evaluate past and present actions toward them, and emotional responsibility for injustice perpetrated (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). However, ethnocentrism, negative stereotypes, and hatred will only change if power asymmetries are reduced so that different groups perceive an equal opportunity for material and social resource attainment. Optimally, resource attainment would be mutually dependent with antagonistic groups deriving positive outcomes that replace the costly price of conflict (de Waal, 2000). Below the IRM is proposed to explain intergroup relations and specify the conditions that will promote reconciliation.

The Intergroup Relations Model

The Intergroup Relations Model (IRM) specifies cognitive and affective processes that determine intergroup behavior and is presented as a latent variable model in Figure 15.1. In the IRM the most proximate determinant of intergroup behavior is affect that is itself determined jointly by ethnocentrism and stereotypes. This specification assumes further that ethnocentrism and stereotypes are correlated constructs. The cognition-affect-behavior mediational model
diagramed in Figure 15.1 is presumed to be *moderated* by groups’ equality of opportunity for resource (i.e., material and social) attainment. For example, Blacks and Hispanics in America living in adjacent neighborhoods compete, equally or unequally, for the same resources (e.g., jobs). America and al Qaeda seek to annihilate each other because each fears domination by the other, while America and Great Britain compete economically yet offer mutual support. Most generally, the basic moderator of IRM processes is the perceived equality of opportunity for procurement of material and social resources and is discussed in the next section.

The IRM is consistent with other models that specify intergroup emotion as the proximate cause of behavior (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993). The IRM also shares some similarities with Stephan and Stephan’s (2000) integrated threat theory in which perceptions and negative contact affect intergroup anxiety and threat that, in turn, affect attitudes toward a group. The IRM is also consistent with the social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization (Turner, 1987) theories that postulate incorporation of the social identity as a facet of the individual, psychological self that is implicated in responses to both in- and out-groups. The IRM is also influenced by the view that intergroup relations are fundamentally competitive (Campbell, 1965; Hardin, 1968; Heylighen & Campbell, 1995; Sherif, 1966) because of realistic conflict over material and social resources.

What differentiates the IRM from other conceptualizations is the integration of basic constructs in a single explicit model, the specification of cognitive primacy (ethnocentrism and stereotypes) that impacts emotion and, in turn, behavior, and the claim that the mediational processes are moderated by the equality of opportunity for resource attainment. This moderator of the IRM is derived from theoretical work on power (Fiske, 1993; Keltner
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et al., 2003); social dominance (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001), realistic conflict (Campbell, 1965), and social stigma (Crocker & Major, 1989). The processes of the IRM can also be moderated by strong in-group identification in cases of war, threat, and attack (McCauley, Worchel, Moghaddam, & Lee, 2004), and by mutual intergroup outcome dependency (Preuschoft, Wang, Filippo, & de Waal, 2002).

Perceived Equality and Inequality of Opportunity for Resource Attainment

If members of two groups perceive an equal opportunity to attain material and social resources (Keltner et al., 2003) given an equivalent expenditure of effort (Homans, 1974), groups will respect, or simply tolerate each other’s culture, stereotypes will be neutral to positive, and intergroup affect will be neutral to positive. Intergroup behavior will be realistically competitive (Campbell, 1965; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) but nonaggressive. In cases when groups’ reinforcements are mutually dependent (Preuschoft, Wang, Filippo, & de Waal, 2002), members of different groups need one another and know this; consequently this recognition will facilitate reconciliation.

Group members may perceive that, relative to other groups, their opportunity for resource attainment is not equal given equivalent effort. Pruitt (1998) said “an assessment of the outcomes achieved by one’s group, organization, or nation appears to be the most important source of collective conflict” (p. 470). With an unfair advantage there will be mutual dislike, trust will be low, stereotypes will be negative, and responses will occur to gain control of resources for the in-group. The powerful group will feel anger toward the less powerful and will be inclined to “move against them” behaviorally (Mackie et al., 2000) often by imposing social control such as enlarging the size of law enforcement (Jackson, 1989). The less powerful group will challenge the social structure, and each group will evidence ethnocentrism. When a group procures an inequitable share of the resources, cultural and psychological processes operate to maintain the inequality (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). The advantaged exaggerate group differences, view the in-group as superior, and share negative out-group stereotypes. Discriminatory responses to the disadvantaged follow from dislike and contempt for their inferiority. The disadvantaged will experience stereotype threat, stigmatization, humiliation, mistrust, and reduced self-esteem (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998). When the advantaged are a numerical majority, or in contexts where pernicious stereotypes are most salient, the disadvantaged will disengage (Osborne, 2004; Steele, 1997).
The transition to reconciliation is impossible under conditions of objective, or perceived, inequality because intergroup relations will evidence negative cognitive and affective reciprocity that will preclude postconflict peacemaking. An essential first step in reconciliation is protection of the weak from the strong by neutral brokers acceptable to both factions, and subsequent intervention by trusted third parties (e.g., respected international leaders) to promote equality of opportunity and fairness. Ultimately, the structural change of social institutions must occur so that equality of opportunity is institutionalized. Optimally, adversaries’ reinforcements should be mutually dependent. Only then can intergroup cognitive and affective processes change and facilitate the transition from reciprocal conflict to reciprocal cooperation; that is, reconciliation.

The Componential Structure of Reciprocal Intergroup Relations

Intergroup processes are not unidirectional; rather, when entities (individuals, teams, nations) respond to one another these responses are reciprocal. Consequently, intergroup relations are dyadic and reciprocal, and the application of methods for analysis of the components of dyadic data can be implemented. One method, termed variance component analysis, originated in psychometrics (Cronbach, Gleser, Nanda, & Rajaratnam, 1972) and biometrics (Searle, Casella, & McCulloch, 1992), was introduced to social psychology by Kenny (1994). These methods have proven useful in studies of a broad range of intergroup phenomena (Malloy & Albright, 2001; Malloy, Albright, Diaz-Loving, Dong, & Lee, 2004; Malloy, Albright, Kenny, Agatstein, & Winquist, 1997; Malloy, Barcelos, Arruda, DeRosa, & Fonseca, 2005; Miller & Malloy, 2003). Because reconciliation is a change in reciprocal responses over time, variance component analysis is directly relevant because reciprocity at different levels of analysis, with distinct theoretical meaning, can be considered.

To elaborate the componential structure of intergroup relations imagine two groups, the Hatfields (H) and the McCoys (M), two feuding clans on the Kentucky and Virginia border in the late 19th century. McCoys, upset by an “unjust” court decision regarding ownership of a hog, ambushed Hatfields while hunting. The Hatfields retaliated and killed a McCoy. The theoretical structure of a response by a Hatfield to a McCoy is presented in Figure 15.2. Theoretically, H’s response to M is a function of: (a) the consistency of H’s responses to members of out-groups in general (e.g., A, B, C, as well as M) called an actor effect, (b) the consistency of responses elicited by M from members of out-groups (e.g., A, B, C, as well as H) called a partner effect, and (c) by H’s
unique response to M called, a *uniqueness effect*, after controlling for actor and partner effects. The reciprocal response of M to H has the same components. These three components of an intergroup response, termed *actor*, *partner*, and *uniqueness*, must be partitioned because each has a distinct psychological meaning; failure to partition these effects conflates psychologically distinct intergroup phenomena.

**Psychological Interpretation of the Variance Components in Intergroup Responses**

Consider the reactions of groups A and Z to groups B, C, and D. Assume that members of A share a positive stereotype about groups B, C, and D and that members of Z share a negative stereotype about B, C, and D. In Table 15.1 hypothetical data representing this pattern are presented. Such a pattern is termed an *actor effect* and all of the variation in intergroup responses is between groups A and Z. Now consider the responses of B, C, and D to A and Z. Assume that B, C, and D hold similar positive stereotypes of A and similar negative
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Table 15.1 Intergroup Actor, Partner, and Relationship Effects

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<th>Intergroup Actor Effects</th>
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Note. Entries are hypothetical data on a 10 point scale with 1 representing the most negative stereotype and 10 the most positive stereotype.

stereotypes of Z. This pattern is termed a partner effect and all of the variation in intergroup responses elicited is between groups A and Z. In some cases one group responds uniquely to another group. In this example, members of B share uniquely positive stereotypes of Z and members of C share uniquely negative stereotypes of A. These are called uniqueness effects.

Formally, A’s response to B on dimension X yielding $X_{ab}$ may be partitioned into the following terms:

$$X_{ab} = \mu + \alpha_a + \beta_b + \gamma_{ab} + \varepsilon$$

(15.1)

where $\alpha_a$ is the consistency of A’s responses to multiple groups (actor effect), $\beta_b$ is the consistency of B’s effect on responses elicited from other groups (partner effect), and $\gamma_{ab}$ is A’s unique response to B after controlling for $\alpha_a$ and $\beta_b$. The constant $\mu$ is the average of intergroup responses, and $\varepsilon$ is random error.
Terms of the model are assumed to be normally distributed random variables. Likewise, B’s response to A is represented by:

\[ X_{ba} = \mu + \alpha_b + \beta_a + \gamma_{ba} + \varepsilon \]  

(15.2)

The variances of the components (i.e., \( \alpha \), \( \beta \), and \( \gamma \)) are computed yielding estimates that quantify the consistency of intergroup responses emitted (actor), elicited (partner), and uniquely made to specific groups (uniqueness). The null hypothesis tested is that a variance component equals zero. The variances and covariances of the components, as well as the components’ relationships with other variables, quantify a broad range of intergroup phenomena with generalized and dyadic reciprocity being centrally relevant to reconciliation.

In traditional Fisherian analysis, the mean response in one condition is compared to the mean response in a different condition. However, variance component analysis quantifies phenomena using variances and covariances as well as means. The means of un-decomposed scores (e.g., \( X_{ab} \) and \( X_{ba} \) in Equations 15.11 and 15.2) are considered, yet the variances and covariances of the components of \( X \) (\( \alpha \), \( \beta \), \( \gamma \)) are of primary interest. Variance component analysis enhances conceptual and statistical precision, and serves a heuristic function by guiding attention to new phenomena and questions.

The theoretical structure of intergroup responses has important methodological implications for research on reconciliation. First, reconciliation will be reciprocal rather than unidirectional. To understand the response of a Hatfield to a McCoy, one must measure the response of H to M and that of M to H. Second, the reconciliation responses of H to M and M to H are each determined by the actor, partner, and uniqueness effects. Yet, if measurements are limited only to H’s response to M and M’s response to H, there is insufficient information to estimate the actor, partner, and uniqueness effects. Multiple, rather than single, interaction designs are required to estimate the reciprocity and componential structure of intergroup relations. Third, reciprocity is the core mechanism of reconciliation that unfolds temporally. However, two forms of reciprocity must be distinguished for conceptual clarity: generalized and dyadic (Kenny & Nasby, 1980). Generalized reciprocity is the extent to which a group’s consistent responses to multiple other groups are generally reciprocated by them, and is estimated by the correlation of a group’s actor and partner effects. Dyadic reciprocity, however, is limited to specific pairs of groups and is estimated by the correlation of uniqueness effects. Correlations representing generalized (actor-partner components) and dyadic (uniqueness-uniqueness components) reciprocity are presented in Figure 15.2. Unfortunately, the distinction between generalized and dyadic reciprocity has been mostly ignored in research on intergroup relations and reconciliation.
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Fourth, modeling intergroup reconciliation begins with a focus on the theoretically relevant components of the IRM constructs and should not be limited to whole, un-decomposed scores. To know clearly if reconciliation is occurring, one should estimate dyadic reciprocity without the confounding effect of generalized reciprocity.

Power, Reciprocity, and a Reconciliation Attempt

The October 2, 1960 Sunday edition of the *New York Times* presented a sociogram depicting visits among eight international leaders during a 2 week meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations. International tensions were high, nuclear war was a feared potential, and the Cuban Missile Crisis was yet to materialize. One can assume ethnocentrism, negative stereotypes, and dislike among some leaders although relevant data are unavailable. The data available quantify face to face intergroup contact among the leaders; a construct thought to foster harmony (Pettigrew, 1998) and reconciliation (see Baron, Deutsch, and Kelman, this volume). The data are presented in a single $8 \times 8$ round robin matrix (see Malloy & Albright, 2001) in Table 15.2. Actor, partner, and uniqueness variance components were estimated, as well as individual and dyadic reciprocity. Approximately 24% of the variance in visits was due to differences among leaders’ actor effects. Following Kenny (1994), leader $i$’s actor effect is computed by:

$$\alpha_i = M_i \frac{(n-1)^2}{n(n-2)} + M_{..} \frac{n-1}{n(n-2)} - M \frac{n-1}{n-2}$$

where $M_i$ is the average of visits initiated by leader $i$, $M_{..}$ is the average of visits made to leader $i$, and $M$ is the average number of visits among the eight leaders. For leader $i$, $\alpha_i$ is the actor effect. Nehru of India was the most active initiator of visits ($\alpha = .60$) and Eisenhower initiated the least ($\alpha = -.71$).

Partner effects quantify relative approach by other leaders and for leader $i$ is:

$$\beta_i = M_i \frac{(n-1)^2}{n(n-2)} + M_i \frac{n-1}{n(n-2)} - M \frac{n-1}{n-2}$$

where $M_i$ is the average of visits received by leader $i$, $M_i$ is the average visits initiated by $i$, and $M$ is the average visits among the leaders. For leader $i$, $\beta_i$ is the partner effect. Approximately 22% of the variance was due to difference among leaders in visits received; Khrushchev was approached the most ($\beta = .83$) whereas Macmillan was approached the least ($\beta = -.56$).
The difference between approach and avoidance among leaders is an index of power (Keltner et al., 2003). For leader $i$, power ($P_i$) may be quantified by:

$$P_i = \beta_i - \alpha_i$$

(15.5)

where $P_i$ is relative power of leader $i$, and is defined as the difference between being approached ($\beta_i$) and the initiation of approach ($\alpha_i$). Positive $P$ values indicate that a leader was approached by others more than he approached them. Negative $P$ values indicate that a leader approached others more than he was approached by them, and a value of zero for $P$ indicates that approaching and being approached were equal. When $P = 0$, conditions are prime for reconciliation because approach is equal for the protagonists in a conflict, and the stage is set for a transition from negative to positive reciprocity. As $P$ values depart from zero the likelihood of reconciliation diminishes. Khrushchev had the greatest power ($P = 1.13$) because he was approached the most (mean of 1.57 visits) and made very few visits to other leaders (mean of .29). Eisenhower was the second most powerful leader ($P = .63$) with an average of .71 visitors and 0 visits initiated. Nassar, Nehru, and Macmillan were the least powerful ($P$s of

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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Variance Components**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Uniqueness/Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Face to Face Meetings</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reciprocity Correlations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Generalized</th>
<th>Dyadic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Error variance should be near zero with little error of measurement because these visits were very public events observed and reported by the international press.
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-.75, −.50, and −.50, respectively). Nassar and Nehru made the greatest number of visits (nine each, with mean visits of 1.29 for each) but their visits were not reciprocated (means of .43 and .71, respectively). Macmillan made five visits and was visited only once.

This analysis of power may seem at odds with other approaches. For example, theoretical analysis predicts that high power should produce approach behavior (Keltner et al., 2003) and empirical data confirm that power leads to action (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). Yet, in different contexts different norms may moderate the power-action relationship, and these data show that power within the context of strategic international negotiation can lead to inaction. In the case of world leaders, inaction was a public proclamation of high power intended to maintain it and benefit one’s in-group constituents. Action was initiated by the less powerful in deference to the more powerful.

Generalized reciprocity was $r = −.14$ and showed that leaders who initiated visits were not visited by others. Dyadic reciprocity was weak ($r = −.28$); neither powerful nor weak leaders reciprocated visits. Noteworthy is the finding that both generalized and dyadic reciprocity are negative for the contact variable. Perhaps the negative generalized and dyadic reciprocity, particularly among the most powerful leaders (Khrushchev and Eisenhower had zero contact), precluded the reconciliation that could have curtailed the Cuban Missile crisis.

Summary and Conclusions

Two basic questions for a social psychology of intergroup reconciliation were posed; “what system of variables affects reciprocal intergroup responses?” and “what variables affect the transition from intergroup conflict to peaceful coexistence?” In response to the first, the Intergroup Relations Model specifies cognitive and affective processes that determine reciprocal group responses under conditions of perceived equality and inequality of opportunity for resource attainment. The prominent role of cognition in human reconciliation stands in contrast to its trivial importance in postconflict peacemaking among nonhuman primates (de Waal, 2000). Among humans, a transition from reciprocal conflict to peaceful coexistence hinges on implementation of structural change that ensures equality of opportunity for attaining material (e.g., food, employment, medicine, education) and social (e.g., positive social identity, collective respect, self-determination) resources. Although relations
among groups in proximity will almost always be competitive, if competition occurs under equality, peaceful coexistence is possible. As documented in this volume, intergroup reconciliation can be facilitated by equal status contact while confronting a common challenge, by educational interventions, by cognitive reorganization that diminishes sharp intergroup boundaries, and by public pronouncements of wrongdoing with reciprocal apology and forgiveness. However, equality of opportunity is hypothesized to be the major moderator of transition from conflict to peaceful coexistence. Reconciliation will always be slow and unsteady because the requisite structural change is always at odds with the advantage held by powerful groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001) that will actively undermine change (Heylighen & Campbell, 1995). Yet, structural change can be implemented if antagonists realize they are mutually interdependent. For example, when the advantaged and powerful understand the staggering economic and social costs, for the in-group, of institutional racism, the unjust occupation of an adversary, or the disenfranchisement of an ethnic group there can be an incentive to create an equality of opportunity motivated by self-interest. When occupation, racism, and domination are too costly, the transition to equality of opportunity for resource attainment can occur with attendant reconciliation. Intergroup psychology will then be more positive.

These theoretical ideas have methodological implications. Because intergroup relations are two-sided and reciprocal, it is essential to consider the componential structure of intergroup perception, affect, and behavior for conceptual clarity and analytic precision. Failure to isolate actor, partner, and uniqueness effects in intergroup responses precludes assessment of psychologically distinct intergroup phenomena. Intergroup conflict will often be dyadic with two primary protagonists. Consequently, reconciliation will involve a transition from negative dyadic reciprocity toward positive dyadic reciprocity. Following this, generalized reciprocity will follow. Therefore, it is essential to differentiate generalized and dyadic intergroup phenomena and not conflate them.

Acknowledgments

Fredric Agatstein, Jennifer Berdahl, Jeffrey Fisher, Arie Nadler, David Sugarman, and the members of the University of Rhode Island and Rhode Island College social psychology seminars provided helpful comments on this chapter. Preparation of this chapter was supported, in part, by a Rhode Island College faculty research grant.
References


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AQI: We have changed equation number "15.4" to "15.3". Trust the change is fine.